

# THE SECURITY VARIABLE AND ITS IMPACT IN SHAPING THE FUTURE OF IRAQI-SAUDI RELATIONS AFTER 2003

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## ABSTRACT

*Assessing the process of rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia beyond 2014 until now is not easy given the regional changes that surround the political arena in the region and the increasing international influences*

*The future of the Saudi-Saudi rapprochement depends on the Iranian and US movements as the Gulf's most understanding and aware of the importance of rapprochement and the most capable of their potential for the process of rapprochement; preferably not when trying to improve the traditional Iraqi-Saudi relations in commercial and banking investments; Means of convergence to include all areas of political, security, military, economic, social and cultural, and Iraq must realize that achieving full rapprochement with the Gulf countries depends on solving outstanding problems, and that this convergence must be a means of Realize the strategic objective of Iraq's return to its Arab environment through the Gulf gate and the curtailment of Iranian influence*

*In light of the interactions of the US foreign agent and the specificity of US interests with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, alternative and alternative options will emerge that will create the potential of the economic capabilities of the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to maintain stable and cooperative relations with Iraq under the situation. And for the foreseeable future*

*Which allows to crystallize the variables of interactions of the internal environment and external Gulf Iraqi in general and Saudi Arabia in particular.*

*However, the existence of real political will to employ variables and interactions of the internal environment and external Gulf Iraqi will be conditional on the curtailment of Iranian influence in various areas in Iraq*

*Because working hard to find future visions of the nature of Iraqi-Saudi relations based on cooperation will contribute to reaching understandings on many internal and external challenges at the political, economic, social and military security levels of both countries*

*Keyword: security variable. Shaping . future of Iraqi-Saudi relations*

**INTRODUCTION**

1 ..1 . The stability of Iraqi-Saudi relations (probability of stability)

The new approach in Iraqi politics calling for openness and dialogue with neighboring countries

Had been linked to the post of former Prime Minister (Haider Abadi) after 2014 of theses on dialogue and openness to the countries of the world in general, and the neighboring countries, especially geographical.

By calling for the crystallization of a moderate and new political thought that is not opposed to openness with neighboring countries, while emphasizing the values of mutual respect in regional and international relations, security for all, and recognition of the principles and balances of each country (1).

Theses have been considered as direct positive messages to the Gulf states in general and Saudi Arabia in particular and a new language that these countries have not previously committed to in the policy of Iraq, which was adopted for a period not short model tension with some neighboring countries.

Thus, the Gulf-Iraqi relations in general, and the Saudi-Iraqi relations in particular, have witnessed a clear breakthrough in the wake of the accession of Mr. Haider al-Abadi as prime minister in mid-2014; and under conditions entirely different from those surrounding the presidency of the former Prime Minister (Nuri al-Maliki) Maliki came to the presidency in a stressful environment regionally and internationally. (2)

In 2014 and the subsequent political change at the level of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers has been reflected positively on the performance of Iraqi foreign policy and within the following formats:

a . A change in the quality of Iraqi political awareness of the network of circumstances and new roles, and how to manage the file of foreign policy in Iraq regionally and internationally.

B . Under the government of Mr. Haider al-Abadi, there seems to be a new direction for foreign policy that has

been characterized, albeit partially, by different features from the period preceding it, to appear to be a distinguishing feature of the Iraqi foreign policy. And the international support for the government (Abadi) and deal with an updated and objective vision for the restoration of the status and role of Iraq as a regional power affecting its Arab environment. (3)

C. The Iraqi deal with opportunities and challenges with the kind of dynamism necessary to minimize the cost and maximize the return, under reasonable conditions of satisfaction determined by the nature of the stage that surrounds the Iraqi foreign policy in a supportive regional and international environment. (4)

Dr . The important shift in the performance of foreign policy after 2014 was based on several inputs. The events of 2014 (a massive invasion of large areas and cities in Iraq), one of which led to the government of (former Haider Abadi) and later the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi, The current ministers to a clear change in their perceptions related to the internal and external environment and through a strategy based on several foundations, notably the following: (5)

First, the Iraqi foreign policy is not merely a reaction to the internal or external environment because it is a conscious process that involves trying to influence the environment, internal or external, or adapting to it and achieving a set of objectives, most notably the return of Iraq to its Arab environment through the gate of the Gulf states and foremost Saudi.

Second: the ability to combine realism as a method of action and a link to the objectives of Iraqi foreign policy and ambition and desire to play certain roles commensurate with the status of Iraq as a regional power influential in the Middle East

Third, the former government of Abadi and the current government realized that the Iraqi foreign policy had suffered from a lack of clarity of vision and orientation. The regional environment, its turbulent turmoil, the power of ideological attraction, polarization, and the politics of international axes have made Iraqi foreign policy dependent on theoretical approaches to protect its foreign interests. This impasse lies in improving Iraq's

relationship with its regional environment, especially the Gulf ( 6)

1 ..2. . Saudi Arabia recognizes that the gains of rapprochement and stability under the government of the former Prime Minister (Haider al-Abadi) were for the benefit of the GCC countries, security, political and economic

As for the Gulf states, it was seeking to gain Iraq to strengthen its position and influence in the region to break the stalemate of its foreign policy in light of the tension of the Gulf-Iraqi relations period of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki

Saudi Arabia sees Iraq as a key partner in the Arab Gulf region, especially in the matter of achieving security and stability in this region through resolving and resolving the outstanding issues between Iraq and the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for several reasons including:

- a . Geo-strategic location of Iraq
- B . Maintain regional balance of power in the Gulf region
- C. The Saudi strategic vision for Gulf security is ( 7 )

First: in an attempt to attract Iraq to the Gulf axis for the purpose of reducing the military force and tame the Iranian role in the Arabian Gulf

Second: Developing and building a regional deterrent force in the Gulf in which Iraq is part of the Gulf security system

Thus, the beginning of the development in the Saudi-Iraqi relations after 2014 in many aspects, including trade exchange by granting facilities to businessmen from both sides without intermediary for their exports

Prior to 2014, Saudi-Iraqi relations were still in a state of tension. As Saudi-Iraqi relations improved, it was in the Saudi interest not to disturb the new atmosphere of convergence because it believed that the gains of convergence and stability were in the interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council

And that the nature and visions of prospecting in the scene of stability of the Iraqi-Saudi relations (probability of stability)

In the near term, carries signs of encouraging the growing relations between the two countries for several reasons, notably the following ( 8 ):

a . The real desire of the Gulf to return Iraq once again is a cornerstone of the Arab regional order.

Considering that Iraq is Iran's traditional rival in the region and the wall of the Sad, which played important roles in the past to address the Iranian penetration in the Gulf and in the Arab national security services, as part of a strategic Gulf project, which has determinants, objectives and tools to help achieve its objectives.

Addressing Iran's influence in Iraq and reducing its chances of achieving its goals is one of the most important strategic goals the Iraqi national forces should pursue in the foreseeable future. Without this, Iraq will remain an open arena for internal conflicts linked to regional and international agendas. In a state of weakness and division and dispersion, which prevents the return of Iraq once again an active and influential element in the Arab regional system. (9)

B . Iraq is no longer a challenge but an opportunity for Gulf regional security

And the attempt by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to curtail Iran's influence in Iraq because Saudi Arabia is afraid of increasing the power of Iranian influence in Iraq, which is reflected negatively on any political, economic or security rapprochement with Iraq.

C. Energy security in its comprehensive sense

Saudi Arabia believes that the security of the Arabian Gulf in the strict sense cannot be settled unless Iraq becomes part of the Gulf security system, and the justifications are two things:

First: The precedents of Gulf support for Iraq in its war with Iran 1980-1988 were aimed at protecting the Gulf oil tankers, which meant that energy security in its

comprehensive sense was a red line for the Gulf states ( 10 )

1 ..3 .. Evolution of the performance of the security variable in Iraqi-Saudi relations

) The possibility of escalating the role of the security variable (

The development of the port Arar border, which is still not effective in front of the trade movement, was one of the priorities of activating the Iraqi-Saudi Coordination Council to consider: (11)

First, it is important to increase the volume of trade exchange between the two countries. This is done by re-establishing the Transit Agreement between the Arab League countries, which was ratified by Iraq in 1978 and ratified by Saudi Arabia in 1979 in order to facilitate the passage of goods and commodities. Passage of Iraqi pilgrims" .

Second: security related to the exchange of intelligence on terrorist organizations and cooperation in the fight against smuggling, especially since Iraq and Saudi Arabia have long borders

Therefore, the Iraqi and Saudi sides agreed in April 2017 to establish a free zone for the Iraqi exchange between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Najaf to achieve two goals in one economic and security

The opening of the free zone with the governor of the General Authority of Customs in Saudi Arabia (Ahmed Al-Qahbani) on the Iraqi-Saudi border will contribute to the following: (12 )

.Activating the trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and Iraq through the province of Najaf through the establishment of a trade route of 239 km near the border guard post.

.Opens new horizons between the two countries to facilitate the entry and exit of goods and products and trade exchange between the two countries.

Especially since the Saudi-Saudi agreement on increasing the volume of trade exchange between the two

countries was based on the recommendations of the Saudi-Saudi Coordination Council since the signing of its Memorandum of Association in 2017 with the aim of increasing the volume of trade exchange between the two countries

And increase the investment space in Iraq for various ministries and sectors" .

In the near term we will witness a revival in trade between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the purpose of developing trade between the two countries

Therefore, Saudi Arabia has proposed to Iraq the lifting of customs duties on 891 articles or reduce them. Saudi Arabia is also working on opening several new border ports, which will lead to the lifting of customs duties on 891 items ( 13 ).

The file of security and intelligence issues, and the exchange of information and names of those wanted, elements of dialogue, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia a strategic need to activate counter-terrorism and extremism within the regional system

Therefore, the mechanisms of security and intelligence cooperation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were activated after the establishment of the Coordination Council between the two countries. It was agreed to manage the joint security file according to the following principles:

.The two countries agreed to cooperate in the areas of security and intelligence and combating money laundering.

.On April 4, 2019, the two sides agreed on Iraq and Saudi Arabia to manage the security files, including memoranda of understanding, including security, military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries, combating the drug trade and countering money laundering, training Iraqi security forces and protecting borders. Iraq."

.The joint border between the two countries extends from the Saudi-Iraqi border from Tarif near the Jordanian border in the west to Hafr al-Batin near the Kuwaiti border in the east. The length of the border is

814 km and includes seven ports , Two of which operate at specific times, namely, Jamila and Arar ( 14 )

Iraq has a vast database and information about terrorist organizations

With regard to those wanted by terrorist groups, Iraq provided Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states with that base, making it easier to capture them, but Iraq focused its security efforts on Saudi Arabia

Because it (Iraq) has a large border with Saudi Arabia, which requires more cooperation, the arrest of fugitives and infiltrators, of the two States, whether from Iraq or Saudi Arabia. (15)

.The Iraqi-Saudi agreement on the administration of the security file included the issue of training Iraqi forces

It is true that the Iraqi forces are ready and well trained, they receive training from the International Alliance, as well as there were channels of communication with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which offered the training of security forces in Iraq, but it needs Saudi expertise, especially the file of combating terrorism and the prosecution of terrorist groups

Iraq needs information exchange, border control, and the exchange of wanted names, as well as the training of Iraqi security forces. (16) (

.Iraqi Benefit from Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Counseling and Care

Iraqi security experts confirm the possibility of studying the Saudi experience in combating extremism and violence, especially with the presence of a large center in Riyadh to rehabilitate elements and families belonging to extremist organizations, as permitted by Iraqi law, and the possibility of reintegrating those who did not participate in terrorist operations and terrorist organizations in society In different ways through so-called advice. " .

The Iraqi security agencies can benefit from the Saudi experience in accordance with the situation of Iraq, and rehabilitation of those who did not join or belong to any extremist organization. They need this rehabilitation and

talk here about the areas controlled by the organization and the repercussions associated with the camps of the organization's families. Take advantage of that experience and exchange with Duwain Awqaf Shiite and Sunni ( 17 )" .

The Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advocacy and Specialized Anti-Extremist Care provides services that reach the well-being and luxury of more than 3,300 former al-Qaeda and Taliban elements, including former Guantánamo detainees.

When compared to the rest of the prisons and rehabilitation centers in the world, the center is a recreational resort in terms of its services. It has an indoor swimming pool, outdoor courtyards and a gymnasium, although it is actually a rehabilitation center for extremist people.

The center is supervised by elders and psychologists who try to prevent extremists from returning to the cycle of violence through a series of steps that begin with sessions to explain moderation and moderation and end with family care programs after leaving the center. ( 18 )

.Signed the security agreement between the two sides (Iraqi and Saudi) on 17 April 2017

US President George W. Bush's removal of the nuclear deal with Iran and the imposition of further economic sanctions on Iran, with the US threatening to launch a military strike against Iran, added a new reason for Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement, And to achieve a qualitative shift in these relations through several aspects However, the most important development in the process of Saudi-Iraqi relations was the signing of the security agreement between the two sides on 17 April 2017, which included items to combat terrorism and investigate the money laundering operations and control the maritime borders and territorial waters between the two countries.

The agreement has received wide positive reactions, welcomed by the various circles of the Gulf official and popular as an important step in support of Gulf-Iraqi relations, after the perception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq

that the meeting with Iraq is the way leading to the understanding of Iraq (19),

Which resulted in a new Saudi foreign policy seeking to communicate not to the break-up and confrontation with neighboring countries, including Iraq, especially with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially after the growing Iranian presence in the region.

Within this context, the Saudi security rapprochement toward Iraq was seen by many observers as saying that the Saudis saw good relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia as a key factor in reassuring their fears of Iran's presence in the region. To be behind the bombings of oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf and the bombings of Aramco and Fujairah in the middle of 2019, especially after the US decision to deflate Iranian oil (20)

1.4 .. The role of the security variable in Iraqi-Saudi relations has declined

) Possibility of regression opportunities (

The nature of the rapprochement and the normalization of relations between Iraq and the Arab Gulf countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, were based on several strategic principles and that Iraq's lack of investment of these principles means practically declining opportunities for rapprochement and cooperation

with Saudi Arabia as follows : (21)

A - Iraq ignored Saudi strategy based on the style of the initiative

The GCC countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, in their approach to Iraq, have relied on the principle of initiative, a method that does not wait for initiatives but rather offers them

And that Iraq's failure to benefit from this principle is a loss of opportunities for stability and stability of Iraqi-Saudi relations

The agreement of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that Iraq is part of the security system of the Persian Gulf

is an opportunity for Iraq to invest and strengthen its relationship with these countries

The geographical proximity between Iraq and Saudi Arabia provides an opportunity for the generalization and strengthening of relations between the two countries. Saudi Arabia's declaration of readiness to support Iraq economically, politically and security in exchange for curbing Iranian influence is a realistic proof of Saudi Arabia's keenness to promote such rapprochement after planning it based on its experience in regional and international relations (22).

For example, the theory of Gulf security based on the same idea of the beginning on the grounds that the right of Iraq with its historical, geographical, human, political and ideological justification to develop a theory of Gulf security based on the part of this system to achieve its interests not inconsistent with the interests of other countries. (23)

This theory is based on solidarity and cooperation among the countries of the region alone through the elimination of disputes between these countries or the reduction of them to the lowest level, especially on important issues; the border dispute, sectarian strife, ethnic strife, ideological differences and non-activation of the decisions of the Iraqi- Political, military and economic pressures because of the Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government and preventing it from rapprochement with the Gulf is a factor that will contribute to reduce the chances of stability of Iraqi-Saudi relations in the near future.

Because the realization of the security doctrine of the Iraqi Gulf requires the need to provide several elements of the security project, the most important of which is the common understanding of Saudi Arabia for the meaning of long-term security, non-conflict with regional security, and to address all political, economic, social and cultural fields and the absence of Iraqi awareness of the meaning of security means practically In the future (24).

B. Iraq does not invest the opportunity to sign joint agreements with Saudi Arabia in various political,

economic and commercial fields, aiming at activating inter-trade exchanges and activating joint investments.

The disregard of Iraq for the nature of the common interest between him and the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which was achieved through official and non-official visits is also a loss of opportunities ( 25 )

Exchange of technical expertise and employment, as well as ongoing coordination within the framework of OPEC.

For example, the GCC countries are one of Iraq's largest trading partners in the world due to geographical and cultural convergence factors

The promise of activating Iraq's economic and financial agreements with Saudi Arabia will lead to the absence of an element of stability in relations between the two countries ( 26

Saudi Arabia has taken the decision to establish normal relations with Iraq from the highest levels, and is not linked mostly to the rise of a certain stream of power in Iraq, but Saudi Arabia keen to support the unity and sovereignty of Iraq.

This trend towards establishing relations with Saudi Arabia is moving towards the strategic situation, not the tactical and away from the mood of any current or private party, and the official and informal visits by the various parties and the quality of both sides reflect serious and diplomatic move of a new kind contributed to the process of rapprochement between the two countries. (27)

C - Failure of Iraq's cooperation with Saudi Arabia on the issue of production and export of crude oil after the refining of Iranian oil, will contribute to the increase of tension and the decline of the opportunity to establish relations with them in the future

The repercussions of the lack of cooperation between the two countries will be: ( 28 )

.Oil price instability within OPEC

There are historical evidence that confirms this perception. In the years 1997/1998/1999, the issue of oil

has a clear impact on the process of convergence between Iraq and the Gulf because of the great importance in the economies of the Gulf countries, suffered a deterioration in prices from 1997-1998 when it fell to less From \$ 10 a barrel, and as a result of the agreement of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries with Iraq and cooperation with some oil countries, including Iran has settled its price within OPEC.

) 29 .(The collapse of oil prices to levels that affect the economic performance of Iraq

And the loss of (Iraq) to millions of dollars in the case of standing with Iran against the Gulf States and members of the OPEC and will be a clash and not rapprochement or cooperation is a hallmark in Gulf relations with a high probability of Iraq under the sanctions US economic sanctions against Iran

Iraq must remember that Iran has presented its national interests to it and has contributed in the effective coordination between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela (since 2002) to unify their ranks and restore stability to prices at a level that achieves the common interests of producers and consumers between \$ 22-28 per barrel on average

Would Iran today, if it were to hit Iraq with its oil, stand with it and defy international economic sanctions ( 30 )

Not to invest Iraq to activate the protocols of cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the cultural aspect signed in mid-2019

The failure of Iraq to activate the protocol of cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the cultural aspect signed in mid-2019 decisions of the Iraqi-Saudi Coordination Council means that we will not see in the foreseeable future any progress in the relations of these relations or work on their development intellectually, scientifically and culturally.

Because the interest in cultural cooperation within the framework of the cultural cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq to promote cultural exchange between the two countries, but to achieve non-strengthening, Iraq will lose opportunities to develop these relations in the cultural aspect( 31 ).

And that the cultural aspect of Iraqi-Saudi relations comes first to the existence of the factor of civilization and Islam, which increases the ties of these relations and works to develop them intellectually, scientifically and culturally "between the Iraqi and Saudi sides.

And that the lack of investment by Iraq to the chances of the new Saudi leadership of Saudi Arabia, including the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (Prince Mohammed bin Salman), will eventually lead to the lack of crystallization of the conviction of Saudi Arabia and Iraq that the conflict between Sharia and doctrines between them will continue.

And more importantly, Iraq to invest the presence of these pragmatic leaders to strengthen relations between the two sides and more importantly, this conflict will only lead to more instability in the region, and access to such conviction will crystallize a ground in which the absence of understanding and replace the conflict on the legitimacy and doctrines between the two countries . ( 32 )

And . Iraq's continued failure to open new border crossings with Saudi Arabia leaves negative consequences on its economy

Iraq suffers from negative consequences for its economy due to the continued closure of its borders with Saudi Arabia, the failure to open new border crossings between them as a result of the deterioration of security, and the loss of control over the border. On the economic and social stability of the population and their relationship with the government, for all that and others that continued Iraqi governments and Iranian pressure on the non-activation of trade agreements, banking and border with Saudi Arabia, which reflected negatively on the development of Iraq's relationship with Saudi Arabia, Friendly reconstruction and investment in Iraq, and then reflected negatively on the normalization of life for the citizens of security and stability between the two countries. ( 33 )

## CONCLUSION

There are several factors that have led to the Iraqi-Saudi relations towards further dissonance and retreat;

obstacles to the growth of relations between the two countries towards further convergence or restraints that prevent the stability of relations between the two countries, including religious, cultural, political and security, The most important are the following:

First: the impact of the strategic and economic interests that link Iran to Iraq to the stability of Iraqi-Saudi relations

.The threat of the armed Shiite factions that joined in the popular crowd, which Iran contributed to the construction and financing of the march on Saudi Arabia and the overthrow of the rule of the House of Saud

a . Justifications for the formation of the Saudi Islamic Alliance to combat terrorism and the informal actions of the factions loyal to Iran

In the middle of 2016 Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of the "Islamic Alliance for Combating Terrorism", which consists of thirty-five of the 57 member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

But at first sight, and from the consideration of the member states of this alliance and the manner of its composition will be shown to be based on (doctrinal / sectarian), does not contain a Shiite state such as Iran and Iraq, although they are members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation«

The rationale for this alliance is a new maneuver in the conflict between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran and its Houthi partners, the Popular Popular Units and Hezbollah on the other.

And that these factions are loyal to the mandate of the Iranian Faqih, and there are dozens of armed Shiite factions that joined in the framework of popular mobilization, which contributed to the construction and financing of Iran, and legislated by the Iraqi parliament and make it financially and administratively independent of the Ministry of Defense,

The popular mobilization is not a ministry, and therefore its finances and elements are determined in the annual budget year after year. Iraq's budget for 2019 allows

128,000 employees and a budget of \$ 2.17 billion, compared to 583,666 employees and a budget of \$ 9.43 billion for the Ministry of the Interior ( 34 ). .

These forces continue to be a decentralized force. Decentralization reflects the exceptional political, tribal, ethnic-sectarian and geographic diversity within the institution and its lack of a strong and unified leadership structure. Divisions within the "grassroots crowd" must be resolved in order to represent a strong and unified threat to the interests of the United States.

The leaders of the popular crowd, many of the statements threaten to crawl on Saudi Arabia and overthrow the rule of the House of Saud, as a preparation for the departure of the Mahdi, and control of the holy places, and some of their factions have launched the name of the Saudi Saudi opposition (Tiger Tiger), executed by Saudi Arabia, some of its battalions that participated in the battle of Mosul.

Saudi Arabia has received repeated threats by pro-Iranian Shiite factions and the Revolutionary Guards in the region, including threats from the Popular Martyrs' Brigades of Iraq, which declared that Saudi Arabia was a legitimate and legitimate target, and claimed that it would strike and destroy it if it insisted on implementing it. Condemned the death of the Saudi citizen opposition Nimr al-Nimr, saying that "will spare no effort in the burning and destruction of everything related to the Kingdom unless it revisits the death penalty ( 35 ) .

The threats came on the same day that the Iranian government also issued a veiled threat against the Saudi government in the event of its execution Nimr, according to the Assistant Iranian Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, Hussein Abdullahian, in which he said:

That the execution of the tiger tiger, "will cost" a high price, "This is confirmed by political analysts as a clear harmony and roles of the exchange between these Shiite militias and the government of Tehran towards Saudi Arabia.

The threat of some Iraqi Shiite factions led by Abu Mustapha al-Shaibani, which the United States has placed on the list of "global terrorists", is closely linked

to the "Quds Force" of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which represents the special forces responsible for exporting the "Islamic revolution" Clear on Saudi Arabia from the northern front make it take firm measures similar to the situation in Yemen in the south against the militias, "Houthi".

On the other hand, the statements of Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, adviser to the Saudi defense minister and spokesman for the forces of the Alliance "Storm of Packages", saying, "Those who sponsor terrorism cannot be a partner in the fight," in reference to Tehran.

"We are now talking about counterterrorism operations, and if Iran intends to join this alliance, it must stop hurting Syria and Yemen, and refrain from actions that support terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq," he said.

And one of the other restraints that will remain controversial in the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the file of the popular Iraqi crowd as Saudi Arabia sees this force, especially some of its factions loyal to Iran ( 36 )

A factor may change the rules of the game in Iraq. Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, fear that their size and the amount of funding they receive will outweigh the regular Iraqi security forces, just as the IRGC in Iran goes beyond Iran's regular armed forces.

Saudi Arabia is calling for active action against the popular crowd within the US government that there is no time to change the course of the "popular mobilization forces" in itself. Saudi Arabia believes that US security assistance to the regular Iraqi armed forces must be withheld in whole or in part until the concerns are addressed America on "popular crowd forces

Saudi Arabia is looking at the Iraqi government as simply heading towards the abyss, prompting the camp to act in the United States to take a tougher stance in order to pour Iraqi attention to the concrete dangers posed by elements loyal to the engineer in the ranks of the "popular crowd ( 37)".

However, the popular support of the Popular Popular Forces remains strong and the institution itself is highly respected by the country's Shiite majority. This popular

support shows the weak prospect of disbanding or completely isolating the "popular crowd", especially as a result of American pressure.

The Gulf research centers confirm that the current negative status of the influence of the popular mobilization and its relationship with the Iraqi government can take a certain formula as an alternative. The SPLA can stay where it is now, but with the potential advantages of the Iranian-backed "popular mobilization forces" Leadership Movement. They will remain poorly funded (per capita), with their budget set on an annual basis, but Iranian-backed groups will continue to receive an uneven share of the budget and control of the main infrastructure. State control of this force will remain weak ( 38 ).

In the case of the success of the current Iraqi government (the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi) to positively reduce the forces of the crowd, we will see another scenario may be satisfied by Saudi Arabia is the formula:

If the "respected and disciplined forces" model succeeds in Iraq, then the size and budget of the "popular mobilization forces", which will continue to be identified on an annual basis, may gradually diminish.

If the entire force is cut equally - and if the logistical dominance of the popular crowd diminishes, the Iranian-backed "popular mobilization" units will also test a decline in their state-backed capabilities.

So no one knows what the future holds, so no one knows any scenario that awaits the "popular mobilization forces."

However, the arguments and the conditions assumed by Saudi Arabia and the United States of America for the Iraqi government to resolve the popular mobilization as one of the most prominent and complex barbarities in shaping the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia can be exploited:

First, Saudi Arabia's perception of the popular mobilization stems from the idea that it does not care if Saudi Arabia has an organization called the Popular Forces. The movement itself is a problem for the two countries, especially each time a leader of the armed

factions, "These threats undermine our (Saudi) policy of openness and cooperation with Iraq in various fields, especially if these signals are negative and repetitive and instead of the response of the Iraqi government, it is sometimes a clear indication of the (Saudi Arabia) as we are closer to Iraq, we seek to make it (Iraq) as a partner in the security cooperation within the system of the Gulf states, which is not being achieved because of Iranian pressure on Iraq

Second, Saudi Arabia believes that the United States should support the Iraqi government and the regular Iraqi security forces to counter the growing influence of the popular crowd and some of its Iranian-backed factions and prevent the exclusive "popular mobilization forces" from controlling any facility, infrastructure or mission. The only way to ensure that these Iranian-backed forces do not act in such a way as to harm the interests of the Gulf, particularly Saudi and UAE interests, is to subject them to the same oversight requirements under which US forces operate, especially the presence of a large number of regular Iraqi security forces. In particular, "popular crowd" forces should not be allowed to exclusively control profitable missions such as the security of offshore oil terminals, the protection of basic infrastructure facilities, highway monitoring and customs control because you mean real and not virtual threat to the Gulf oil facilities, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE ( 39 ).

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